

Letters for Understanding: Communication During the Cuban Missile Crisis

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Paper

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Initially, I wasn't planning to participate in History Day this year, but when my school announced that it would still be offering History Day as a kind of virtual "club" with more independent-based work, I decided to look into it since I was looking for another writing opportunity. I looked at a list of sample topics, and came across the Cuban Missile Crisis, which I remembered that I had been fascinated with after watching the film *Thirteen Days* a year or two before. I began some basic research to explore the topic further, and then immersed myself in the next few days. From there, I was set on going through with the project.

My most helpful source in creating my project was probably Robert Kennedy's memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. I got a closer perspective on the life of the President and his brother, the Attorney General, during the event, and learned about the topic in depth and substantially more than from any other source. There were also many great quotes that I was able to implement into my writing. Other beneficial sources to me were Khrushchev's letters to President Kennedy, and an interview on the Cuban Missile Crisis with the Russian chairman's son. I wanted to make sure I included as much of *both* the American and Russian perspectives as I could get my hands on despite the commonly seen American-biased details of the event, so these sources were also helpful in my writing.

I love to write, so I decided to create a paper for my project. I'd done an exhibit the previous year, and wanted to try something new. Since the word count for papers is higher, I also felt that I could express my ideas better, rather than using more artistic measures in an exhibit. Cutting down words was a problem for me last year as well as this year, but with some effort, I was able to get my word count down to the limit. I tried to get an earlier start in my project this year and found it quite beneficial to managing my time.

My paper relates to the theme of Communication in History: The Key to Understanding because everything that was done during the Cuban Missile Crisis, every decision made, was based on trying to understand the other country's interest through daily letters exchanged between national leaders and meetings between ambassadors. Careful deliberations and debates took place during the argument to ensure the best possible outcome for the safety of the countries directly involved, and the world. Because of this essential communication, President Kennedy and Soviet Chairman Nikita Khrushchev were able to make good judgments and form peaceful solutions to their opposition and impact further generations of world leaders by setting an example and resolving their conflict without firing nuclear weapons.

A series of political arguments lasting from 1945-1991 known as the Cold War came to a climax in 1962 when the Cuban Missile Crisis escalated the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. During the crisis, the constant communication between United States President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Chairman Nikita Khrushchev is often credited as what saved the opposing superpowers from the risk of nuclear war and endangering millions of civilian lives. Letters exchanged between the conflicting leaders, debates between their advisors, and diplomatic negotiations of ambassadors prevented a Third World War provoked by the long-lasting dispute over nuclear weapons. Even though a series of proxy wars continued for several more decades following the Cuban Missile Crisis, the system for communication between the countries was improved significantly and helped avert nuclear conflict. Additionally, the successful resolution of the event paved the way in terms of communication for future generations of leaders, and demonstrated the importance of global correspondence.

Even before the Cuban Missile Crisis, a tense relationship existed between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the nations were allies in World War II, the United States was skeptical of the Russians' communist government. Following the war, the countries engaged in a series of proxy wars, arms races, and the legendary event coined the "Space Race." The fear of communism skyrocketed when McCarthyism, a campaign led by U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy, caused thousands of people to be wrongly accused of supporting communism and lose their jobs, or suffer other severe consequences throughout the 1950s. The campaign was part of a larger event called the "Red Scare."

In 1959, Fidel Castro, the leader of Cuba, allied with the Soviet Union. Cuba began to rely on Russia for aid and military support. When President Kennedy decided to launch an attack on Cuba in 1961 with the goal to overthrow Castro, the United States and the Soviet Union's

tensions escalated further. The assault, called the Bay of Pigs Invasion, failed, and within a day the forces supporting the United States had surrendered. This event only made the Soviet-American relationship worse now that the Russians and Cubans had established relations (History, "Cuban Missile Crisis").

In response to the Bay of Pigs Invasion and to provide a defense system for their ally, the Soviet Union secretly placed missiles in Cuba. The news reached the United States in October of 1962, when a man named Richard Heyser passed over San Cristobal, Cuba in a reconnaissance U2 plane flight and photographed a Russian missile being assembled on the island, just ninety miles south of the state of Florida. President Kennedy was notified about the discovery two days later on October 16th and quickly assembled a group known as the ExComm (or Executive Committee). Soon he learned the SS-4 missiles were capable of reaching the United States. The President considered his options -- one being a full-scale invasion on Cuba or another, a bombing of the country (Robert Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*) -- but instead he settled on establishing a naval blockade to prevent the delivery of additional weapons to Cuba.

On October 22nd, President Kennedy made an announcement broadcasted across America, warning about the missiles being assembled in Cuba. He assured that military efforts would be used if necessary to ensure the country's safety, and that they would inform the nation of any updates with utmost transparency, saying, "...Our decision on a course of action, this government feels obliged to report this crisis to you in fullest detail" (Kennedy, "Address about the Cuban Missile Crisis"). In order to prevent panic when Americans were informed of what was going on in Cuba, the President tried to communicate honestly and assure their safety. Two days after his address, Soviet ships approached the blockade. The United States held its breath,

but thankfully no firearms were raised, and the Soviet ships stopped short of the line of naval vessels.

Originally, the United States and the ExComm were confused over the true intentions of the Russians, struggling to “discern [Soviet Chairman Nikita] Khrushchev’s motives and intentions” (Sherwin, “One Step from Nuclear War”). Committee members were “often confused” because of this, and found difficulty in trying to find ideas to succeed in their objectives (Sherwin). That changed when, between October 22nd and October 28th, many letters were sent between President Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, the leader of Russia. Through these communications, the two negotiated peace terms while the tension rose. In their letters, Kennedy and Khrushchev both wrote that they wanted to come to terms and avoid nuclear war at all costs. On October 26th, Khrushchev sent a message to the President in which he offered to remove the missiles in Cuba in exchange for an agreement that the United States would not attack their ally (History, “Cuban Missile Crisis”). He wrote: “I understand your concern for the security of the United States, Mr. President, because this is the first duty of the president. However, these questions are also uppermost in our minds. The same duties rest with me as chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers” (Khrushchev to Kennedy, Oct. 26, 1962). Khrushchev had never wanted war, but to “protect [Fidel] Castro’s government by deterring, not fighting, the United States” (American Archives).

Shortly thereafter, Khrushchev further proposed he would disassemble the missiles that had been shipped to Cuba in exchange for the removal of the “Jupiter” missiles from Turkey, which had been stationed there earlier by the United States. The Kennedy Administration initially decided to ignore Khrushchev’s second letter and agree to his original terms, but afterward, American officials accepted Khrushchev’s secondary terms and agreed to withdraw

their missiles from Turkey. On October 28th, the crisis ended when U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy met Russian Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin in order to deliver a message: the United States accepted Khrushchev's terms of peace.

Both leaders knew what would happen if firearms were raised and missiles were launched (Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*). Both leaders knew that if they were, their families and citizens could die. Both recognized that if the nations erupted into full-scale war, their countries and even the world could be annihilated. By making decisions in their best national interests, writing letters back and forth, and sending ambassadors to further confirm peace terms, the two leaders worked to better understand each other and the obligations they had to their countries and people.

Throughout the crisis, President Kennedy was pressured by advisors and ExComm members to make decisions (Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*). Some members favored a blockade as a first step whereas some strongly opposed it, instead arguing that a full-scale invasion was the better choice. In his memoir of the crisis, Robert Kennedy describes the President as acknowledging the pressure on him and believing that Chairman Khrushchev is simultaneously undergoing similar pressures. This recognition was a critical factor in President Kennedy's decision to accept the Chairman's terms (Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*). After the crisis, Khrushchev's son was interviewed about the Russian perspective on the event. His words aligned with President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev's approach to resolving the crisis: "Only one thing could have successfully resolved the crisis—negotiation." He concluded the interview saying, "We have to negotiate with our adversaries and enemies...You will be able to explain to them and understand their position and sooner or later find some peaceful resolution" (LaGrone, "Soviet Perspective on the Cuban Missile Crisis from Nikita Khrushchev's Son").

Without this communication and the realization that each political leader wanted to avoid nuclear war that ultimately was the key to understanding, one country may have fired weapons on the other, resulting in full-scale nuclear combat and millions of deaths. "...You want to relieve your country from danger and this is understandable. However, Cuba also wants this" (Khrushchev to Kennedy, October 26, 1962). Because of this communication, the two countries avoided the imminent danger of starting a third World War.

There was a constant fear among the Americans that a "miscalculation - a mistake in judgement" would be made (Kennedy 62) when the ExComm debated over taking next steps in the crisis. Despite the split decision among Kennedy's advisors between an invasion or a blockade (Kennedy 31), the group was aware that a unified decision was necessary. If not, Soviet ships could deliver more weapons to Cuba, further posing a threat to the United States. If the situation were to be heated enough, the weapons on either side could be fired, causing millions to die: "...The time that was available to the President and his advisors to work...developing a course of action and recommendations for the President, was essential...Our deliberations proved conclusively how important it is that the President have recommendations and opinions...more than one point of view" (Kennedy 111). This idea of multiple perspectives and checks and balances continues to be used in American presidencies in the form of the presidential cabinet.

Attorney General Robert Kennedy also played a crucial role in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Throughout the predicament, Attorney General Kennedy assisted his brother, the president, in his decision-making process. He devised the plan to (primarily) ignore Khrushchev's second letter and later agree to his secondary terms (Library of Congress). More importantly, however, was his role in the last days of the conflict. He met Russian Ambassador Dobrynin several times in Washington on behalf of the United States to negotiate and then later, confirm the agreement to

remove the respective weaponry from Cuba and Turkey (History, "Cuban Missile Crisis").

Without these face-to-face connections between representatives of the conflicting countries, an understanding through only words on paper would have been harder to reach -- throughout the crisis the leaders struggled to understand the intentions of the other party (Kennedy 102/105).

The President continuously asked himself if he could be certain that Khrushchev and the Russians could fully understand his and America's national interest (Kennedy 125).

The meetings were arguably one of the most beneficial methods of communication during the event because the deliberations were immediately received and negotiated, whereas the letters took time to reach the disagreeing leaders. Both tactics, however, aided in the ending of the Cuban Crisis. But these meetings were a turning point in the long deliberations, and consequently, the Cuban Missile Crisis came to a peaceful close. Shortly after Robert Kennedy's last meeting with Dobrynin, he received a call informing him that the Russians had agreed to disassemble their missiles (Kennedy 110).

After the crisis, communication further improved between the United States and Russia. As a result of the letter exchanges between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev, a "hotline" was built which directly connected the White House to the Kremlin (U.S. Dep. of State, Cuban Missile Crisis Milestones). The construction of the phone line was intended to prevent the leaders of the two nations from struggling to understand each other's intentions again. This step in improving the Soviet/American relationship was only taken because of the successful communication and eventual understanding shown by the national leaders during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

The crisis and the communications involved evoked the security of a Missile Test Ban Treaty later made between the United States and the Soviet Union (U.S. Dep. of State, Cuban

Missile Crisis Milestones). Additionally, following the signing of the treaty in mid-September of 1963, Khrushchev and Kennedy met to discuss policy and directly communicate (Roeschley 6, “Nikita Khrushchev, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Aftermath”). Communication improved internationally as well -- the deliberations of the ExComm proved that the President of the United States should have multiple opinions and perspectives when making decisions (Kennedy 111). This crisis is a good example of the increase of diplomacy in government leaders’ circles of advisors. Now, in January of 2021, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is on the political table. The Biden Administration and the Russian Ministry made clear their intentions for continuing another missile reduction treaty for another five years, “signaling” their unanimous commitment to arms control (“The Unheard Voices of the Cuban Missile Crisis”).

Kennedy and Khrushchev’s communication also set a precedent for future leaders, one prominent example being the incredible relationship between Ronald Reagan and Soviet Chairman Gorbachev several decades later in the Cold War era. One of Reagan’s tactics for trying to end the Cold War was through negotiation, and furthermore, it is said, “He fiercely wanted to talk to Soviet leaders from his first days in office” (Leffler, “Ronald Reagan and the Cold War: What Mattered Most”).

The idea of communicating between nations is one that we can apply to conflicts in the twenty-first century. Similar to the communication during World War II and the Cuban Missile Crisis, we can communicate with political groups within our countries as well as those outside our borders to solve issues. Communication and peaceful collaboration between political parties could make a difference in the division of the United States and result in a more united country. Global problems such as our current COVID-19 pandemic could be improved upon by nations working together and communicating in the same way used during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In

this case, we can communicate studies, vaccine recipes, and information between countries to understand mutations of the virus and how they differently affect people. Making accords or passing laws which help improve the circumstances of the climate crisis, for another example, can be agreed upon across countries too. Another conflict that would benefit from communication-based solutions similar to the Cuban Missile Crisis is the current struggle between the US and Iran over nuclear weapons (Radd, “What the Cuban Missile Crisis Teaches us About the US-Iran Diplomacy Today”). It is easier to solve issues if we are willing to band together and negotiate with countries than if nations stand alone. If we can be open to the views of others as we work with foreign countries, we can accomplish more to resolve issues that impact everyone.

The resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis was not seen as a “victory” or “triumph” for any one person or country, but was a lesson as to how nations should communicate and operate together. “...no interview given, no statement made, which would claim any kind of victory...If it [the Cuban Missile Crisis] was a triumph, it was a triumph for the next generation and not any particular government or people” (Kennedy 128). Robert Kennedy stated clearly in the last pages of his memoir, “...The final lesson of the Cuban Missile Crisis is the importance of placing ourselves in the other country’s shoes” (Kennedy 124). Even within social communities, being able to “place ourselves” in other people’s shoes is an important skill to learn as well - in addition to being a critical factor in how the United States and Russia’s leaders resolved the Cuban Missile Crisis. The first step into solving any issue, whether on a smaller or larger scale, is trying to understand the aspects and goals of the other perspective involved. Although it can be difficult to allow ourselves to hear the other angles of the situation, it can help us to resolve problems.

At the center of all the deliberations and arguments of the Cuban Missile Crisis, at the heart of the conflict, there were two men struggling to understand each other and find an outcome that could result in peace, not war between their nations. The only way they successfully did so was through letter communication and ambassador negotiations. The diplomatic strategies used during the crisis were reflected upon when later a phone line was built to connect the countries and establish a less-hostile relationship, and the leaders' efforts took the first steps to creating a Missile Test Ban Treaty (U.S. Dep. of State, Cuban Missile Crisis Milestones). Although the Cuban Missile Crisis would not be the last conflict of the Cold War, it set a precedent for successful methods in resolving conflicts between nations and demonstrated how the countries were capable of handling the situation through peaceful communication.

## Annotated Bibliography

### PRIMARY

“Address to the American People about the Cuban Missile Crisis.” *Address to the American People about the Cuban Missile Crisis | Cuban Missile Crisis | Historical Documents*, [www.atomicarchive.com/resources/documents/cuba/kennedy-speech.html](http://www.atomicarchive.com/resources/documents/cuba/kennedy-speech.html).

This source is a transcript of John F. Kennedy’s address to the United States saying that missiles were being assembled in Cuba. I found this transcript more helpful to me than a video of the 35th president’s statement because it was easier to find quotes that supported my thesis. By reading this document, I learned that the television was one of the ways communication was spread to the entire country and was essential to help citizens prepare for potential threats from Cuba.

“Dobrynin's Cable to the Soviet Foreign Ministry.” *Dobrynin's Cable to the Soviet Foreign Ministry | Cuban Missile Crisis | Historical Documents*, [www.atomicarchive.com/resources/documents/cuba/dobrynin-cable.html](http://www.atomicarchive.com/resources/documents/cuba/dobrynin-cable.html).

In Ambassador Dobrynin’s cable to the Russian Ministry he explained *his* view on the crisis. I think it is important to support both of a conflict’s perspectives as much as possible; this source helped me to see what the Russian perspective - the less often told one - was like. I can tell this is primary, because it was a cable directly from Dobrynin during the last few days of the crisis.

Kennedy, Robert F., et al. *Thirteen Days: a Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Ishi Press International, 2017.

This book was one of my most helpful sources since it gave me a focused and specific view of the crisis from Robert Kennedy, the president's brother, who, during the crisis, assisted President Kennedy and advised him. It gave me a sense of the immense pressure and responsibility on the part of the President because it was written by a person who was closely involved in the event as well as being close to him. I know this is reliable as it is a primary source written by Robert Kennedy--since he was directly involved during the entire crisis, I can confirm that it is indeed primary.

“Kennedy to Khrushchev.” *Kennedy to Khrushchev (October 27, 1962) | Cuban Missile Crisis | Historical Documents*, [www.atomicarchive.com/resources/documents/cuba/kennedy-letter-1.html](http://www.atomicarchive.com/resources/documents/cuba/kennedy-letter-1.html).

This is another letter Kennedy wrote to Khrushchev during the crisis, except it was shorter and only outlined and confirmed information I already obtained from other sources. However, the letter displayed the diplomats the two national leaders attempted to remain during this time. I can tell this is reliable since the document was transcribed from the original letter President Kennedy sent to Khrushchev.

“Kennedy to Khrushchev.” *Kennedy to Khrushchev (October 28, 1962) | Cuban Missile Crisis | Historical Documents,*

[www.atomicarchive.com/resources/documents/cuba/kennedy-letter-2.html](http://www.atomicarchive.com/resources/documents/cuba/kennedy-letter-2.html).

This source confirmed facts I'd already learned about and gave me a specific quote to help support a specific point in my project about historical impact. I can tell this is reliable because it is a transcript of the letter Kennedy sent to Khrushchev on October 28th, and it is primary because it was directly written by John F. Kennedy during the crisis.

“Khrushchev to Kennedy.” *Khrushchev to Kennedy (October 26, 1962) | Cuban Missile Crisis | Historical Documents,*

[www.atomicarchive.com/resources/documents/cuba/khrushchev-letter-2.html](http://www.atomicarchive.com/resources/documents/cuba/khrushchev-letter-2.html).

This document helped me gain insight into the position of the Russian/Cuban alliance in contrast to the typical United States' story. I think it is important to see both sides of an argument, and this document certainly helped me do so since most other articles I found were written from the perspective of the United States. This is a primary source and is a transcript of an actual document written so I can tell it is reliable.

“Khrushchev to Kennedy.” *Khrushchev to Kennedy (October 28, 1962) | Cuban Missile Crisis | Historical Documents*,

[www.atomicarchive.com/resources/documents/cuba/khrushchev-letter-3.html](http://www.atomicarchive.com/resources/documents/cuba/khrushchev-letter-3.html).

Similar to the other documents exchanged between Nikita Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy, this letter helped me to prove the ideas I claimed to be true, and continued to give me insight on the Russians’ perspective. Again, I can tell this source is reliable because it comes straight from a historical document dating back to the era of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

LaGrone, Sam. “Soviet Perspective on the Cuban Missile Crisis from Nikita Khrushchev's Son.”

*USNI*

*News*, 5 Feb. 2013,

[news.usni.org/2012/10/24/soviet-perspective-cuban-missile-crisis-nikita-khrushchevs-son](http://news.usni.org/2012/10/24/soviet-perspective-cuban-missile-crisis-nikita-khrushchevs-son)

This was another source that helped me to understand the Russian perspective of the Cuban Missile Crisis instead of the more commonly expressed American side. From Nikita Khrushchev’s son’s words I was able to compare the reactions to the crisis from two different sides of the argument. This was an interview conducted about the crisis from someone who experienced the event, thus it is a primary source.

## SECONDARY

*Cold War: Cuban Missile Crisis*, [www.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/colc.html](http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/colc.html).

This source confirmed information I'd already found. While I knew most of the information, I made sure to take note of the information detailed about the letters sent back and forth between the nations' leaders during the Cuban Missile Crisis to support my thesis. This site is maintained by historians and comes from a long-trusted administration, so I can tell it is reliable for my research purposes.

History.com Editors. "Cold War History." *History.com*, A&E Television Networks, 27 Oct. 2009, [www.history.com/topics/cold-war/cold-war-history](http://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/cold-war-history).

This source had a great amount of background information that I felt I needed about the relationship of the United States and the Russians prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Each major highlight was briefly described. I found this source reliable because it is a well-trusted site.

History.com Editors. "Cuban Missile Crisis." *History.com*, A&E Television Networks, 4 Jan. 2010,  
[www.history.com/topics/cold-war/cuban-missile-crisis](http://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/cuban-missile-crisis).

This source was full of great information regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis. It detailed the most prominent events during the crisis and helped me to get a general understanding of the topic and major events. I can tell this source is reliable because History.com is a well-trusted site, and the information I gathered here paralleled the facts and statistics of other sources I found.

Leffler, Melvyn P. "Ronald Reagan and the Cold War: What Mattered Most - Texas National Security Review." *Texas National Security Review*, 5 May 2018,  
[tnsr.org/2018/05/ronald-reagan-and-the-cold-war-what-mattered-most/](http://tnsr.org/2018/05/ronald-reagan-and-the-cold-war-what-mattered-most/).

This source helped me prove the significance of the Cuban Missile Crisis in the context of communication between countries and leaders after the fact. This source is credible as it is written by a professor at the University of Virginia, and is secondary as it was not written by someone with a first-hand account of the era.

Radd, Benjamin. "What the Cuban Missile Crisis Teaches Us about US-Iran Diplomacy Today."

*OpenDemocracy*, 26 Feb. 2021,

[www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/what-cuban-missile-crisis-teaches-us-about-us-iran-diplomacy-today/](http://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/what-cuban-missile-crisis-teaches-us-about-us-iran-diplomacy-today/). Accessed 12 Mar. 2021.

This source helped me connect the significance of the Cuban Missile Crisis to the present in a US conflict with Iran. The author of this article is credible, as he teaches at the UCLA International Institute's Center for Middle East Development, and the source is secondary since the majority of events discussed are based in 1962 during the Missile Crisis.

Roeschley, Jason. "Nikita Khrushchev, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Aftermath."

*Constructing the Past*, vol. 12, no. 1, 2011, p. 12,

[digitalcommons.iwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1145&context=constructing](http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1145&context=constructing).

This article gave me a bit more information on the communicative impact of my topic, and the aftermath of the Cuban Crisis. I could tell that this source is credible because it is based in a reliable institution and the information I already acquired from other sources paralleled the contents of the article. I know this source is secondary, because it was published after the crisis and the article was not a first-hand account of the event.

Sherwin, Martin. "One Step from Nuclear War." *National Archives*, 20 Dec. 2017,  
[www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2012/fall/cuban-missiles.html](http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2012/fall/cuban-missiles.html).

This source helped me to enforce the idea of the confusion between the conflicted leaders during the Cuban Missile Crisis before the communications were made and ultimately ended the tension. I found several quotes and paraphrased ideas that I was looking to use as support for my argument, which made this resource particularly beneficial. I know this source is reliable because it is government-based, and since it was not written by a person with a first-hand account, I know that the source is secondary.

"The Unheard Voices of the Cuban Missile Crisis." *All Things Nuclear*, 22 Jan. 2021,  
[allthingsnuclear.org/guest-commentary/the-unheard-voices-of-the-cuban-missile-crisis/](http://allthingsnuclear.org/guest-commentary/the-unheard-voices-of-the-cuban-missile-crisis/).  
Accessed 10 May 2021.

This source helped me to connect my research project and the historical significance to the greater importance and influence on today's world in 2021. This source is secondary due to the fact that it is not a first-hand account, and it is reliable because it is organization-based.

*U.S. Department of State*, U.S. Department of State,

[history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/cuban-missile-crisis](https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/cuban-missile-crisis).

This source had some helpful information about the results of the Cuban Missile Crisis. It proved to be well thought-out and held some important information about the positive consequences relating to communication during the Cold War as the crisis was resolved. I know this one is a secondary source because it was not directly from a person who experienced/was involved in the crisis.