

Divergent Paths: How the Japanese Exclusion Act of 1924 Transformed the Debate on
U.S.-Japan Relations

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At first glance, this year's theme seemed extremely specific, yet after researching it I could identify the theme everywhere. As I was searching for a topic, immigration policy's connection with foreign policy intrigued me. The first topic I came upon was the Act of 1924. However, the Act as a whole was too broad a topic, so I had to focus on a single section.

When I decided to focus on the Japanese Exclusion provision, I was not aware of how interesting it was. Only upon delving in did I come across the parts of this topic that made it unique and significant in history like no other topic. The Japanese Exclusion Act appeared to be an immigration issue, yet the clause was part of an ongoing debate between American isolationists and internationalists about relations with Japan, along with a diplomatic debate between Japan and the U.S.

I started my research by searching about my topic online. After finding some websites and articles, I scoured through those articles' citations to find books on my topic. *The Turning Point in U.S.-Japanese Relations* was an especially helpful secondary source. After developing my argument, I then searched for primary sources that supported my thesis. Many of them were recorded congressional hearings and telegraphic communication between the U.S. and Japan. However, it was challenging to find various sources that I needed to establish a perspective of Japanese domestic debate.

I chose to create a historical paper for my NHD project because I have been entering into the category for many years now. Writing is always natural for me, and words are the only tools I need to further my historical argument. However, the process of footnotes was painstaking, as well as revising my paper over and over again before I submitted it to the contest. Still, despite these frustrating processes, the enjoyment I gleaned outweighed everything else.

My historical argument is that the Japanese Exclusion Act was more than an immigration issue— it was a venue for American isolationists and internationalists to debate the future of U.S. foreign policy toward Japan and the American approach toward the world stage. While isolationists wished to use the exclusion provision to rift ties with Japan, internationalists strove to uphold and preserve what they believed was a beneficial and significant foreign relationship.

The Japanese Exclusion Act was significant because it was a very direct way in which the isolationists distanced America from Japan and East Asia as a whole. The passing of the provision marked a gradual increase in isolationism across the American public and government. The bombing of Pearl Harbor itself was the result of America's sometimes blind pursuit of isolationism and indifference toward Japan's increasingly aggressive stance. Although not the main motive of the Act, anti-Japanese sentiments were indulged throughout the debate and rooted themselves deeply in American society, contributing to current Asian hate crimes and other forms of discrimination, making the event itself controversial in its successes, failures, and consequences.

“America... goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy... She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own”—

John Quincy Adams¹

“The most tragic paradox of our time can be found in the failure of nation-states to recognize the imperatives of internationalism.” — Earl Warren²

Introduction:

The Japanese Exclusion Act of 1924 was not solely a provision strictly restricting Japanese immigration but the product of years of debate between American isolationists and internationalists over relations with Japan and the international family. Isolationists wielded the exclusion provision to pursue a non-engagement approach toward international affairs, starting with severe domestic policy toward immigrants, while internationalists opposed the passing of the bill, instead supporting a friendly relationship with Japan. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, grappling with the idea that the ultimate decision could lead to a significant change in its own foreign policy, communicated its views to Congress through an ambassador. High-stake debate led to an inevitable stalemate when each side refused to sympathize with the other. The provision was eventually voted through— lauded as a victory for isolationism. However, non-engagement led to a major setback when the two world powers fought on opposite sides in World War II. In this sense, the Japanese Exclusion Act was not only a failure for internationalism but also for isolationism. Its lessons are still crucial to this day.

¹ Adams, John Quincy. “July 4, 1821: Speech to the US House of Representatives on Foreign Policy.” *Miller Center*, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/july-4-1821-speech-us-house-representatives-foreign-policy>.

² “Earl Warren - The most tragic paradox of our time is to be...” *Brainy Quote*, https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/earl_warren_161818.

Background: Veiled Rivalrous Plays

The U.S. and Japan's relationship commenced when Japan's centuries of seclusion were ended by Commodore Matthew C. Perry in 1853, who was sent by internationalist President Millard Fillmore.³ A mutually beneficial relationship formed—the U.S. guided Japan in modernizing and opening up to the world, while Japan acted as a crucial foothold for the U.S. in the Pacific.⁴

World War I (1914-18) changed that. With Europe in ruins and the emergence of both nations as rising powers, the power balance shifted. Japan encountered America's advances in the same region it sought a dominant position in—the Pacific.⁵ Despite this challenge, the Japanese civil government aspired to integrate itself into the international stage and become a world power through its alliance with America.⁶ Contrarily, the military believed that military prowess and aggression were more effective in achieving the country's ambitious goals. However, audacious military expansion was not popular with a public that suffered chronic food shortages and high unemployment.⁷ The civil government, too, experienced public disapproval when their Racial Equality Proposal to promote “the principle of equality of nations and just treatment of their nationals”⁸ was rejected by Western powers in 1919.

On the other side of the Pacific, America was divided over relations with Japan. Internationalists sought to engage with other world powers, including Japan, to promote American interests at home and abroad. Their efforts were challenged by renewed American

³ Iokibe, Makoto. *The History of US-Japan Relations: From Perry to the Present*. Translated by Tosh Minohara, Springer Singapore, 2017. p. 6.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., p. 25.

⁶ Ibid., 6.

⁷ “Exclusion Law is Scored.” *The New York Times*, 26 May 1924, p. 1.

⁸ Krenn, Michael L., editor. *The Impact of Race on U.S. Foreign Policy: A Reader*. Garland Pub., 1999. p. 270.

isolationism, which accused internationalism of causing high American casualties in World War I.⁹ Many isolationists also capitalized on anti-Japanese sentiment on the West Coast,¹⁰ immigration being a by-product of internationalism, to emphasize a general disillusionment with world affairs.

Buildup: Culmination of International and Domestic Tensions

The Washington Conference (1921-22) was considered a major victory for both countries' internationalists. The agreement on the construction of capital ships—a 5:5:3 ratio for the US, Britain, and Japan, respectively¹¹—successfully limited the armament race and settled post-war insecurities in the Pacific.¹² Among those involved were Japanese diplomat Masanao Hanihara and U.S. Secretary of State Charles Hughes, both internationalists, and conservative isolationist Henry Cabot Lodge.¹³ They would also participate in the Japanese Exclusion Act debate, but for the time being, the internationalists' approach of engagement and involvement prevailed.

However, U.S.- Japan relations were more seriously threatened by immigration issues. The Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907 was formed between the two nations to limit the influx of Japanese immigrants to the West Coast.¹⁴ It successfully placated anti-Japanese sentiments on the West Coast while maintaining cordial relations with Japan.¹⁵ Nonetheless, as 1924, a presidential

⁹ "Milestones: 1937–1945." *Milestones: 1937–1945 - Office of the Historian*, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/american-isolationism>.

¹⁰ See Appendix A.

¹¹ Maurer, John, and Erik Goldstein, editors. *The Washington Conference, 1921-22: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor*. Taylor & Francis, 2012. p. 131.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 152.

¹³ Goldstein, "The Washington Conference." p. 131.

¹⁴ Daniels, Roger. *Guarding the Golden Door: American Immigration Policy and Immigrants Since 1882*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005. p. 44.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 45.

election year, approached, isolationists saw that drawing up a more restrictive immigration bill was needed to mobilize anti-Japanese sentiment for political gain and to push Japan away politically and diplomatically. One advocate of isolationism announced that Gentlemen's Agreement was the greatest "relinquishment of sovereignty [that] has ever been made by any other nation on the face of the earth"¹⁶— isolationism's signature remark when it came to internationalism's close cooperation with foreign nations. Ambassador Masanao Hanihara was concerned about the potential this issue possessed in straining U.S.-Japan relations.¹⁷ In an article published in a diplomatic journal, he summarized the Japanese government's position:

On this issue, our government maintained a very sympathetic and friendly attitude toward the United States. We have no intention to force an issue that will bring difficulties to the US government. Japan, however, will not tolerate its nationals being discriminated against[.]¹⁸

Heart of the Story: Debate and Diplomacy

On December 5th, 1923, the Japanese Exclusion Act, which prohibited all Japanese nationals ineligible for citizenship from immigrating to America,¹⁹ was introduced to Congress.²⁰

¹⁶ United States Congress. *Japanese Immigration Legislation: Hearings Before the Committee on Immigration, United States Senate, Sixty-Eighth Congress, First Session on S. 2576; a Bill to Limit the Immigration of Aliens Into the United States, and for Other Purposes; March 11, 12.* Fb&c Limited, 2017. p. 16.

¹⁷ Chuma, Kiyofuku, and Misuzu Hanihara Chow. *The Turning Point in US-Japan Relations: Hanihara's Cherry Blossom Diplomacy in 1920-1930*. Palgrave Macmillan US, 2016. p. 126.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ United States. *The Statutes at Large of the United States from December, 1923, to March, 1925*. vol. 43, University of Minnesota, 1925. p. 162.

²⁰ Duus, Masayo. *The Japanese Conspiracy: The Oahu Sugar Strike of 1920*. Translated by Beth Cary, University of California Press, 1999. p. 300.

This bill was heavily sponsored by isolationist West Coast politicians.²¹ Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts also played a significant role.²² Lodge, a veteran isolationist, was always a prominent presence in international conferences, including the Washington Conference, to prevent any blunders on the part of overenthusiastic internationalists.

The bill immediately caught the attention of the Japanese civil government.²³ The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs urged their ambassador, Masanao Hanihara,²⁴ to alert U.S. Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes²⁵ about the discriminatory nature of the exclusion act.²⁶ Hanihara and Hughes had a close friendship due to their shared belief in internationalism and the ideals and principles of America's relationship with Japan.²⁷ Hanihara, in a memorandum, denounced that the provision would stigmatize Japan "as unworthy and undesirable".²⁸ Hughes assured him that the situation would be duly handled since he was confident the exclusion provision would not win the support of the Senate—in which the diplomatic consequences of the provision would be widely and thoroughly understood.²⁹ Despite this, Hughes reminded the Japanese government to keep to the side of cooperation by curbing the spread of anti-American sentiments in the Japanese public.³⁰

However, close cooperation between the two did not hinder the fierce debate between internationalists and isolationists in Congress. A hearing before the House Committee on Immigration took place from March 11th to 15th.³¹ V.S. McClatchy, a Californian, uttered a

²¹ Atkinson, David C. *The Burden of White Supremacy: Containing Asian Migration in the British Empire and the United States*. University of North Carolina Press, 2016. p. 209.

²² See Appendix B.

²³ Chuma and Chouw, "*The Turning Point in US-Japan Relations*." p. 139

²⁴ See Appendix C.

²⁵ See Appendix D.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Hanihara, Masanao. "Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1924, Volume II." *Office of the Historian*, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1924v02/d280>.

²⁹ Chuma and Chow, "*The Turning Point in US-Japan Relations*." p. 139.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ United States Congress, "*Japanese Immigration Legislation*", p. 1.

robust statement on the isolationists' position. He stated that “it is our right to regulate [immigration] by our own laws, in accordance with our own interests, regardless of the interests or protests or demands or threats of other peoples and other nations.”³² In defending his position, McClatchy had turned to what he considered the most effective tactics of isolationism— fear. In particular, he argued about the inability of Japanese immigrants to assimilate into American society and their ambition to “colonize” the U.S. under the instruction of the Japanese government.³³ McClatchy stated that the “threat” of Japanese immigrants could spread throughout the nation if it were not fully addressed— that passing the Japanese Exclusion Act would be the solution. As McClatchy put it, “Neighbors may be friendly and continue indefinitely as friends if they do not attempt to live in the same house”.³⁴ His testimony was applauded by his fellow isolationists. Senator Samuel M. Shortridge lauded McClatchy’s “broad American patriotism” and his faithful “contemplation [on] the welfare of the whole Nation as a nation”.³⁵ Shortridge, for his part, claimed that the idea of a nationally isolationist policy was based on “historical knowledge, and... foresight [that] framed our Constitution”, and the “wisdom [that] must maintain and guide it”.³⁶ He cited George Washington as an exemplar figure who understood the need to isolate America from outside threats to maintain its national innocence and purity.

Internationalists were not deterred by the rhetoric of fear. LeBaron B. Colt, the Chairman, interrupted McClatchy numerous times to highlight the consequences it would bring to relations with Japan. He argued that Japan was anything but a threat. Instead, maintaining close ties with the country was crucial for the U.S.: American businesses made fortunes by exporting products

³² Ibid., p. 5.

³³ Ibid., p. 3.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 146.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 5.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 147.

to Japan, and also depended on the cheap labor Japanese immigrants provided, not to mention the security Japan maintained in the Pacific.³⁷ After all, American democracy thrived because of engagement with people from other nations, rather than fear of the outside world and subsequent isolation. As to the problem of Japanese immigrants, the Chairman suggested modifying the Gentlemen's Agreement, or "extend[ing] the quota laws to the Japanese",³⁸ as an alternative. Pennsylvania Senator David A. Reed and many other Senators stood behind this stance.³⁹ As neither side was willing to capitulate, the debate lapsed into a stalemate.

The deadlocked debate was distressing to Hanihara, Hughes, and the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Foreign Minister Matsui Keishiro urged Hanihara to take further action in Washington.⁴⁰ Hanihara, under the guidance of Hughes, wrote a letter to the State Department.⁴¹ The letter was an attempt to break the deadlock in internationalism's favor.⁴² In particular, Hughes advised Hanihara to emphasize the consequences of the bill, and the Japanese government's willingness to cooperate with the U.S. on the issue.⁴³ However, in foreign policy, there is a fine line between cooperation and interference. Hanihara was conscious of this, and he started his letter with a cautious tone: "It is in no way intended as a restriction on the sovereign right of the United States to regulate its immigration".⁴⁴ He then stated that the Japanese government was willing to "amend or modify some of the terms of the Agreement",⁴⁵ suggesting cooperative negotiations. However, the letter ended in a very serious tone:

³⁷ LaFeber, Walter. *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations Throughout History*. W.W. Norton, 1998. p. 53.

³⁸ United States Congress, "Japanese Immigration Legislation", p. 154.

³⁹ Ibid. p. 154.

⁴⁰ LaFeber, "The Clash", p. 145

⁴¹ Chuma and Chow, "The Turning Point in US-Japan Relations", p. 142.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Hanihara, Masanao, "Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations".

⁴⁵ Ibid.

Relying upon [your] confidence... I have stated or rather repeated all this to you very candidly and in a most friendly spirit... the grave consequences which the enactment of the measure retaining that particular provision would inevitably bring upon the otherwise happy and mutually advantageous relations between our two countries.⁴⁶

This letter, known best as the “Hanihara Note”, did break the stalemate in the Senate, but not to the favor of the internationalists. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who rarely spoke throughout much of the debate, interpreted the letter uniquely and harshly,⁴⁷ then launched a fierce attack unimaginable to both Hughes and Hanihara:

The letter addressed to our State Department by the ambassador from Japan seems to me a letter improper to be addressed by the representative of one great country to another friendly country. It contains, I regret much to say, a veiled threat... the United States can not legislate by the exercise by any other country of veiled threats.⁴⁸

Whether “grave consequences” was justly and reasonably interpreted as a “veiled threat” is not profoundly important here. What mattered was that Lodge seized on the two words to validate and amplify the fear his fellow isolationists had spread. The threat that the Japanese immigrants and their government posed to the U.S. —an unfounded argument— now appeared to be real and serious in Lodge’s reading of the letter— the letter was nothing but an indication of the Japanese government’s interference with America’s sovereign rights. The ensuing anger and indignation pushed many Senators in favor of the bill to retaliate against Japan’s

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Chuma and Chow, “*The Turning Point in US-Japan Relations.*” p. 142.

⁴⁸ “Senate, 76 to 2, Scraps Agreement with the Japanese.” *The New York Times*, 15 April 1924, p. 1.

interference. In an open session, they denounced the Gentlemen's Agreement and expressed their approval for the new exclusion act.⁴⁹ Albert Johnson, for instance, emphasized that "[we] feel that the gentlemen's agreement humiliates this nation".⁵⁰ Senator Reed, a leader in the fight for a Japanese quota, said he now felt "compelled... to vote in favor of exclusion".⁵¹ The Japanese Exclusion Act passed the Senate 69 to 9.⁵²

Afterward: Downhill Tumble Into Isolationism & Beyond

The Japanese Exclusion Act became a turning point in U.S.-Japan relations, one that melted away to hostility.⁵³ After the bill was signed into law by President Calvin Coolidge, the Japanese government condemned it as a gesture of racism—under the pressure of the widespread anti-American sentiment in the general public.⁵⁴ Japanese militarists gained political traction from this incident and used it to justify military expansion. Japan became less cooperative and more suspicious of America.⁵⁵ For isolationists in the U.S. government, this victory gave them momentum to move foreign policies further away from engagement with other world powers. In a revisitation of the Washington Conference in 1925, the three powers of Britain, the U.S., and Japan convened to discuss customs tariffs in China. However, they failed to reach an agreement due to Japan's blatant uncooperative stance and America's indifference, resulting in a major blow to the stability of the area.⁵⁶

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Daniels, Roger. *The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion*. University of California Press, 1977. p. 102.

⁵² Duus, "The Japanese Conspiracy", p. 306.

⁵³ "Japanese Still Stirred by Our Exclusion Act." *The New York Times*, 30 November 1924, p. 168.

⁵⁴ Chuma and Chow, "The Turning Point in US-Japan Relations", p. 160.

⁵⁵ "Japan Still Stirred by Our Exclusion Act."

⁵⁶ Iokibe, "The History of US-Japan Relations", p. 74.

As America gradually withdrew from affairs in the Pacific, Japan became more ambitious and aggressive. In 1931, Japan, under influence of its military, invaded Manchuria at the sacrifice of numerous international treaties.⁵⁷ Its military leader declared this war as a “‘struggle for supremacy’ between America, the ‘leader of the West’, and Japan, ‘the leader of the East’”.⁵⁸ The U.S. responded with negligence: the highly isolationist Congress pushed to withdraw American soldiers from China to avoid potential conflict with Japan.⁵⁹ In December of 1937, when Japan accidentally bombed the U.S. warship *Panay*, the U.S. chose to completely withdraw its vessels in the area, rather than adopting a more constructive approach to Japan.⁶⁰ Japan’s increasingly bold expansionism directly correlated with America’s deeper plunge into isolationism. It was the ideal situation for the Japanese military. The infamous attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941,⁶¹ was the culmination of the rapid and unchecked growth of American isolationism, and thus an echo of the consequences caused by the Japanese Exclusion Act. This act of open aggression immediately awakened internationalist forces to assert power over the situation.

The end of World War II marked America's decisive shift to international engagement and reconciliation with Japan.⁶² As for the Japanese Exclusion provision, the new Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 ultimately repealed its measures.⁶³ Nevertheless, anti-Asian sentiment, carelessly indulged as a political weapon and spurred on by isolationists of the time, remains today. Isolationism too still has staunch supporters, prominently former President Donald Trump. Despite this, America is currently in limbo. The war in Ukraine and other

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 84.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 90.

⁶⁰ Peifer, Douglas Carl. *Choosing War: Presidential Decisions in the Maine, Lusitania, and Panay Incidents*. Oxford University Press, 2016. p. 197.

⁶¹ History.com Editors. “Pearl Harbor: Attack, Casualties & Facts - HISTORY.” *History.com*, 2 December 2021, <https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/pearl-harbor>.

⁶² Iokibe, “*The History of US-Japan Relations*.” p. 5.

⁶³ “Milestones: 1945–1952 - Office of the Historian.” *Milestones: 1945–1952 - Office of the Historian*, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/immigration-act>.

negatively potent conflicts abroad reinvigorate discussions about America's responsibilities. The answer is that America must take part in maintaining the order of today's globalized world while bestowing sufficient attention on perpetuating non-entanglement in international affairs; internationalism and isolationism must balance their ideas and bring their patriotic energy together to keep America prospering.

Conclusion:

The Japanese Exclusion Act of 1924 was a significant milestone in U.S.-Japan relations and America's struggle between isolationism and internationalism. This provision has long-resounding consequences; its immediate success for isolationism was gradually supplanted by long-term failure for both Japan and America. Decades later, we still need to analyze the views of all sides to understand America's role on the world stage and lead the country to a desirable future.

Appendix A:



Political cartoons encouraging anti-Japanese sentiment

Citation:

<https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CYpGAGLWcAEfdAj?format=png&name=360x360>

Appendix B:



Henry Cabot Lodge

Citation:

“Henry Cabot Lodge | United States senator [1850-1924] | Britannica.” *Encyclopedia Britannica*,
<https://www.britannica.com/biography/Henry-Cabot-Lodge-United-States-senator-1850-1924>.

Appendix C:



Masanao Hanihara

Citation:

“Masanao Hanihara - Alchetron, the Free Social Encyclopedia.” *Alchetron.com*, 11 Aug. 2018,
<https://alchetron.com/Masanao-Hanihara>.

Appendix D:



Charles E. Hughes

Citation:

Pollak, Michael. "Costly Lapse by a New York Presidential Candidate (Published 2016)." *The New York Times*, 24 April 2016,
<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/24/nyregion/costly-lapse-by-anew-york-presidential-candidate.html>.

Annotated Bibliography:

Primary Sources:

“Exclusion Law is Scored.” *The New York Times*, 26 May 1924, p. 1.

This was an important article for my understanding of the series of events leading up to the passing and signing of the Japanese Exclusion Act, in the lens of those who had experienced it.

Hanihara, Masanao. “Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1924, Volume II.” *Office of the Historian*,
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1924v02/d280>. Accessed 6 March 2022.

This was an important source for my paper—one that I used to develop my understanding of the “Hanihara Note” and the way Lodge used it to break the stalemate in the Senate. This letter’s style of writing and tone also allowed me to develop Hanihara’s perspective in my paper.

“Japanese Still Stirred by Our Exclusion Act.” *The New York Times*, 30 November 1924, p. 168.

This New York Times article explains and analyzes comprehensively the symbolic impact the immigration bill had in scarring Japan’s trust in America and its overall cooperation with the international stage. This also helped me understand better the Japanese public’s humiliation and protestations toward the bill.

United States. *The Statutes at Large of the United States from December, 1923, to March, 1925.*

vol. 43, University of Minnesota, 1925.

This volume of Senate proceedings allowed me to dive deeper into the details of the Japanese Exclusion provision. It was extremely helpful in understanding the impact the provision had on Japanese immigration to the U.S.

United States Congress. *Japanese Immigration Legislation: Hearings Before the Committee on Immigration, United States Senate, Sixty-Eighth Congress, First Session on S. 2576; a Bill to Limit the Immigration of Aliens Into the United States, and for Other Purposes; March 11, 12, .* Fb&c Limited, 2017.

This document provided the main source for my analysis of the debate between the isolationists and internationalists on the matter of the Japanese Exclusion Act. The verbatim documentation of the words spoken at the hearing were crucial for my argument as a whole.

“SENATE, 76 TO 2, SCRAPS AGREEMENT WITH THE JAPANESE.” *New York Times*, 15 April 1924.

It was extremely difficult to understand the essence of the “Hanihara Note” in the Senate, as Lodge requested an executive session. However, this New York Times article recorded the statements of the Senators involved upon open session, and was used accordingly to further my analysis of the debate.

Secondary Sources:

Atkinson, David C. *The Burden of White Supremacy: Containing Asian Migration in the British Empire and the United States*. University of North Carolina Press, 2016.

This book provided a comprehensive overview from a moral standpoint of the Japanese Exclusion Act and was overall very helpful for me to develop a basic understanding of the topic as a whole.

Chuma, Kiyofuku, and Misuzu Hanihara Chow. *The Turning Point in US-Japan Relations: Hanihara's Cherry Blossom Diplomacy in 1920-1930*. Palgrave Macmillan US, 2016.

This book allowed me to deeply delve into Masanao Hanihara's perspective of the Japanese Exclusion Act and the debate surrounding it. It was especially helpful in establishing an understanding of his feelings toward how his note was interpreted by Lodge.

Daniels, Roger. *Guarding the Golden Door: American Immigration Policy and Immigrants Since 1882*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005.

The immigration viewpoint of the Japanese Exclusion Act and the circumstances preceding it were comprehensively summed up in this book. It was extremely important

to my understanding of the practical use and reasons of the exclusion clause, not just the symbolic nature of it.

Daniels, Roger. *The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion*. University of California Press, 1977.

This book allowed me to establish a strong understanding of the perspective of West Coast isolationists, major players in the debate and diplomacy of my topic. This was invaluable toward my research.

History.com Editors. “Pearl Harbor: Attack, Casualties & Facts - HISTORY.” *History.com*, 2 December 2021, <https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/pearl-harbor>. Accessed 7 March 2022.

This article gave a comprehensive summary of Pearl Harbor, which was rather directly related to the isolationism America chose to embrace after the passing of the Japanese Exclusion Act.

Iokibe, Makoto. *The History of US-Japan Relations: From Perry to the Present*. Translated by Tosh Minohara, Springer Singapore, 2017.

This book helped me comprehend the diplomatic events leading up to and following the introduction of the Japanese Exclusion Act. It aided me in describing the buildup and impacts of my topic in history.

Krenn, Michael L., editor. *The Impact of Race on U.S. Foreign Policy: A Reader*. Garland Pub., 1999.

This book also provided a moral standpoint toward American foreign policy and dealt with the issues of race and prejudice in the Japanese Exclusion Act and other events closely related with it, including the Racial Equality Proposal. It was useful for my research.

LaFeber, Walter. *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations Throughout History*. W.W. Norton, 1998.

This book was especially helpful in explaining to me the history of U.S.-Japan relations as well as the political circumstances of the two countries surrounding the passing of the immigration bill. I used it to analyze deteriorating relations between the two nations as a result of the act.

Maurer, John, and Erik Goldstein, editors. *The Washington Conference, 1921-22: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor*. Taylor & Francis, 2012.

The Washington Conference and the way it impacted U.S.-Japan relations were very important in developing my main argument. This book provided an extremely understandable overview of the event, which was crucially connected to my topic.

“Milestones: 1937–1945.” *Milestones: 1937–1945 - Office of the Historian*,

<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/american-isolationism>. Accessed 12 April 2022.

This summed up comprehensively the ideas and principles behind American isolationism. It was crucial for my analysis of the isolationists’ perspective when participating in the debates about the Japanese Exclusion Act.

“Milestones: 1945–1952 - Office of the Historian.” *Milestones: 1945–1952 - Office of the*

Historian, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/immigration-act>. Accessed 9 March 2022.

This was very important in understanding the way the Japanese Exclusion Act was finally repealed. It helped contribute to the impact section of my paper.

Peifer, Douglas Carl. *Choosing War: Presidential Decisions in the Maine, Lusitania, and Panay Incidents*. Oxford University Press, 2016.

This book polished my understanding of how the Panay incident contributed to the continued deterioration of U.S.-Japan relations, and the views of Congress and the American public when it came to the incident.